A Generalized Theory of Household Behavior under Rationing by Podkaminer, L.
A Generalized Theory of 






Podkaminer, L. (1984) A Generalized Theory of Household Behavior under Rationing. IIASA Collaborative Paper. 
Copyright © October 1984 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/2532/ All rights reserved. Permission to 
make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee 
provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage. All copies must bear this 
notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute 
to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
A GENERALIZED THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD 




Institute of Economic Sciences 
of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 
Warsaw, Poland 
Collaborative Papers report work which has not been performed 
solely a t  the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis and which has received only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of 
the Institute, i t s  National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
2361 Laxenburg, Austria 

PREFACE 
Many of today's most significant socioeconomic problems, such as slower 
economic growth, the decline of some established industries, and shifts in pat- 
terns of foreign trade, are international or transnational in nature. But these 
problems manifest themselves in a variety of ways; both the intensities and the 
perceptions of the problems differ from one country to another, so that inter- 
country comparative analyses of recent historical developments are necessary. 
Through these analyses we attempt to identify the underlying processes of 
economic structural change and formulate useful hypotheses concerning 
future developments. The understanding of these processes and future pros- 
pects provides the focus for IIASA's project on Comparative Analysis of 
Economic Structure and Growth. 
Our research concentrates primarily on the empirical analysis of interre- 
gional and intertemporal economic structural change, on the sources of and 
constraints on economic growth, on problems of adaptation to sudden changes. 
and especially on problems arising from changing patterns of international 
trade, resource availability, and technology. The project relies on IIASA's accu- 
mulated expertise in related fields and, in particular, on the data bases and sys- 
tems of models that  have been developed in the recent past. 
In this paper, Leon Podkaminer reviews the work of Neary and Roberts on 
household behavior under rationing and its implications for attempts to "recon- 
struct Keynesian economics." Podkaminer concludes that the method used by 
Neary and Roberts to relate rationed to unrationed demand functions, via the 
concept of "virtual" prices, only holds in certain very restricted circumstances. 
He then proposes an alternative and more general approach to the evaluation of 
demand under various rationing schemes when only indirect utility functions 
are h o w n .  
Anatoli Smyshlyaev 
A o j e c t  Leader 
Comparative Analysis of 
Economic Structure and Growth 

A GENERALIZED THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR 
UNDER RATIONING 
L e o n  Bdkaminer 
lnstitute of Economic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 
Warsaw, Poland 
The results of Neary and Roberts (1980) relating rationed demand func- 
tions to the unrationed demand functions via the concept of "virtual" prices are 
shorn to hold only in certain restricted circumstances. An alternative and 
generalized approach is suggested for the evaluation of effective demand under 
any arbitrarily-chosen rationing scheme. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many of the recent advances in economic theory and econometrics have 
been associated with the  "disequilibrium revolution," which began with a 
reawakening of interest in the study of the micro foundations of 
macroeconomic analysis. A central role in this revolution was played by the 
implications of household decision making subject to quantity constraints (and 
not merely to the "orthodox" budget constraint). However. as  Neary and 
Roberts (1980, pp. 25-26) observed, "the basic theory of household behaviour in 
the presence of rationing remains in an unsatisfactory state. The principal 
results in this area derived by Tobin and Houthakker (1950-51) and restated by 
Pollak (1969) apply only for the case where the ration just 'bites', in the sense 
that the ration levels coincide with the quantities which would have been 
chosen by an unrationed household facing the same prices and income." 
The extension of the theory provided by Neary and Roberts (1980, p. 26) 
promised "... a complete characterization of rationed demand and supply func- 
tions which relates their properties to the properties of the unrationed demand 
and supply functions without the necessity of explicitly specifying the direct 
utility function." As this characterization has been utilized for n o  less 
important an endeavor than the reconstruction o f  Keynesian economics by 
Neary and Stiglitz (1983), i t  may be just the right time to subject the Neary and 
Roberts theory to closer scrutiny - and to offer a proper alternative to it. The 
structure of this paper is very simple. Section 2 presents the basic features of 
the Neary-Roberts theory, referred to hereafter simply as N-R. Section 3 
discusses a number of difficulties with which the theory is fraught; in particu- 
lar, its h a i n  result is shown to be valid only in the circumstances allowed for by 
Tobin and Houthakker (1950-51). Sections 4 and 5 then offer an alternative 
approach to the problem of evaluating demand under various rationing 
schemes (including schemes not studied before) when only indirect utility 
functions are known. 
2. BASIC ASPECTS OF THE NEARY-ROBERTS THEORY 
The utility function of the household studied satisfies all the familiar regu- 
larity conditions such as quasiconcavity and montonicity. The vector of goods 
entering the utility function as its argument is partitioned into two distinct 
subvectors. Retaining the N-R notation, z is the subvector of goods "freely 
chosen" and y is the subvector of goods "imposed," i.e. those the household is 
"forced to consume. If p and q are vectors of "actual" (or "administered") 
prices associated with z and y. respectively, and b is  the lump-sum household 
income, then the 5 that is eventually "beely" chosen must satisfy 
u(E,g) = max Iu(z,y)  : pz r b-qgj (1) 
where u ( z . y )  is the utility function and y is the vector of specific quantities 
the household is "forced" to consume. 
The next step is to introduce "virtual" (or support) prices, "which would 
induce an unrationed household to behave in the same manner as when faced 
with a given vector of ration constraints." It soon emerges that the actual and 
the virtual prices for the unrationed goods are identical. so that the term "vir- 
tual prices" may be retained exclusively for the  vector (as distinct from its 
actual value q) .  
The basic N-R result may be summarized in one equation: 
where z"(y,p,q ,b ) is the vector of rationed demand (and also supply, for goods 
that the household may sell, such as working time) functions for the freely- 
chosen goods, z ( p  ,q , b ) is the vector of ordinary unrationed (Marshallian) 
demand functions for z,  and the vector of virtual prices is determined from 
the equation 
where y (p.q , b  ) is the vector of ordinary unrationed (Marshallian) demand 
(supply) functions for the imposed goods. 
According to (2). the  function z(.::) is to be evaluated a t  virtual prices 
(p.g) and income inflated (deflated) by the expenditure involuntarily saved 
(spent) on consumption of the imposed goods, i.e. by (i - q)y. Of course, (2) is 
well deflned provided (3) always has a unique solution i f .  As is implied, this is 
actually the case, a t  least for b + (g - q)ij > 0. 
3. THE CRITIQUE 
3.1. Determination of the Levels of Forced Activities for (1) 
While under the most extreme cases of war economy the household may be 
forced to supply some goods (e.g. labor or commandeered vehicles), it is usually 
still free to refuse to purchase or consume (or to resell on the black market), 
say. the full ration of tobacco to which i t  is entitled. In contemporary com- 
mand economies, while rationed in the markets for goods, households are free 
to  consume less than their entitlement. In market economies under a regime 
of involuntary unemployment, the employees may not be able to sell as much 
labor as they might wish, yet there is still nothing that forces them to sell some 
specific amount of it. When the peculiar notion of coercion t o  consume some 
quantities of some goods is discarded, a more relevant basic model for an 
environment with rationing would therefore stipulate the existence of bounds 
on the household's activities (upper for purchases and lower for sales). This 
can be represented by the Following maximization problem: 
where y j y* translates into y r y* (IJ I y*) for supplied (demanded) goods sub- 
ject to potenCial rationing. 
The diflerence between (1) and (4) is not merely semantic. The unique 
solution to (4), (Z.y"), may appear to be actively constrained by some (but not 
necessarily all) coordinates of the vector y*. In (I),  y would therefore consist 
of only those coordinates in y" that "hit" the respective bounds (9 = yi*). There 
are two conclusions to be drawn at this stage. F~rs t ,  prior to any analysis start- 
ing with (1). one must  perform the optimization (4) with numerical values for 
y* corresponding to the existing (formally administered or actually perceived. 
though not necessarily eventually constraining) bounds on the household's 
activities. Formulas (2)-(3) evidently do not apply when y is replaced by y*. 
(They might apply when y is replaced by y = f ( p , q  ,ya,b).) If, however, we are 
able to solve (4) there is no need for any additional formulas such as (2). Also, 
all relevant information related to the comparative statics properties of the 
rationed demand would automatically follow the solution to (4) as regards its 
sensitivity analysis. 
Second, let  us  go so far as to assume that y = 5 .  Consider a formally 
extreme (but theoretically important and practically quite plausible) case 
where the household perceives bounds on all of its activities. Now (4) is 
equivalent to 
If y" = y* (all bounds are "hit") and qy" = b (there is no compulsory saving or 
dissaving) and yet is different from the unconstrained household's optimum 
yo, given by 
then the  analysis starting with ( I )  is not feasible. This is because there are, in 
this case, exactly n (the dimension of y )  alternatke y( i ) :  
each commanding an equally justifiable version of (1). but differing with 
respect to  the definition of the "freely" demanded good. Of course, the 
optimum solutions to the alternative versions of (1) are the same. Yet their 
local properties, which are needed for the comparative statics exercises, evi- 
dently diverge. 
I t  is also worth noting that the above conclusions hold too when the 
rationed and unrationed demands (supplies) (i.e. the solutions to (5) and (6)) 
coincide. This utterly extreme and virtually implausible situation may be 
interpreted as one of an atomistic household embedded in an economy frozen 
a t  a general equilibrium and having perfect knowledge of the market's (and its 
own) predicament. 
3.2. Need Viua l  (Support) Prices for the Rationed Goods Be Unique? 
Let us return to (1) and accept y as somehow correctly evaluated; presum- 
ably this could be done by solving (4) but without paying any attention to the 
status of the corresponding dual prices (i.e. ~ a ~ r a n ~ e  multipliers). Even under 
these circumstances, it appears that the system of equations (3), which serves 
N-R as a source of (unique) "support" prices ( q )  for the rationed goods, cannot 
be trusted because in some cases i t  cannot have a unique solution. Consider, 
for example, a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the following form 
For this case the ordinary unrationed (Marshallian) demand functions 
y,/i l.q l,q2,b ) are given by 
Thus, for (3) we have two equations to determine ijl,q2: 
For a number of configurations of parameters (al,a2,Y1,Y2,q1,q2), (8) and (9) 
are linearly dependent and yield a continuum of solutions for il,q2. (For 
instance this happens when al = a2 = yl = yz = q = q2.) For numerous other 
conftgurations, (0) and (9) possess no meaningful (i.e. positive) solutions. I t  
may therefore be concluded that,  even if (8) and (9) have a unique positive 
solution, its status must remain suspect. 
4. BEYOND THE QUANTITY BOUNDS 
The basic approach to the evaluation of demand under rationing prescribed 
by (4) needs three distinct additions. First, the quantity constraints 
y s y* (y 2 y*) correspond to a regime of rationing whereby various poten- 
tially lacking (unsold) goods are treated separately. In practice, however, 
whenever the rationing takes on some institutionalized shape, there are  ration- 
ing schemes that allow some degree of substitution among the various goods 
subject to rationing. Thus, the households (and firms) a re  "given" some total 
"ration points" (b(1).b(2) , . . . , b(m)) and vectors of the "ration point prices" 
(n(1).n(2), . . . ,n(m)) are  prescribed so that the budget constraint and the upper 
(lower) bounds are  complemented by a system of linear inequalities: 
Secondly, a not uncommon device under rationing stipulates tha t  " h a r d  quan- 
tity constraints (y I y*)  be replaced by presumably "softer" variable pricing. 
Therefore the "actual" price the household (firm) pays depends on the quantity 
purchased: q = q(y) .  (This trick is often used in the pricing of electric power 
or in rationing water consumption in arid regions. Also, rents  in publicly-owned 
housing tend to vary with the amount of living space per family member.) 
Quite often the "hard" quantity constraint for a good is replaced by discontinu- 
ous pricing: 
qj'- for yj yj 
gjiij) = I  (qj- < $1 
-+ for yj > yj  
I 
A counterpart to  (4) allowing for the existence of systems of "ration point 
prices" and soft ra ther  than hard quantity constraints is quite straightforward 
to  develop. It is given by the following problem: 
maximize u ( z , y ) ,  (11) 
subject to  pz + q (y )y 5 b and yn ( j )  s b( j )  j = 1.2, ..., m 
It may be worth noting that  ( l l ) ,  still a concave programming problem, contin- 
ues to  possess a unique solution. However, its analytical (explicit) derivation 
upon the formulation of the first-order (Lagrange) conditions is inappropriate, 
since Kuhn-Tucker conditions a re  relevant here. The appropriate operational 
approach for the determination of the optimum is, of course, any version of the 
gradient method. (Nonsmoothness in pricing q (y )  may of course dictate the 
application of nonsmooth gradient methods.) Also, the fact tha t  the optimum 
solution is expected to  be accompanied by sets of subderivatives with respect to  
the parameters (prices, rations, income) - and not merely unique derivatives - 
must not be overlooked either. 
5. EYALUATION OF DEXAND UNDER RATIONING WHE3 ONLY INDIRECT 
UTILITY FUNCTIONS ARE KNOWN: A DUAL TO ROY'S IDE3TlTY 
The arguments presented in this section are  based upon Podkaminer 
(1983). 
Problem (11) presupposes knowledge of the utility function in its ordinary 
form. However, both economic theory and even empirical economic research 
increasingly rely on utility functions in indirect forms, or alternatively, on 
expenditure or cost-of-utility functions. While the underlying household prefer- 
ences (or the  production correspondences of firms) are - in theory - equally 
well described by direct or i nh rec t  utility functions (or expenditure functions), 
theoretical economic analysis using indirect utility forms is much more con- 
venient and powerful, especially when the utility is homothetic. Also, the 
econometric estimation of the indirect utility function is much easier to per- 
form without postulating tha t  it has oversimplified properties (such as constant 
elasticity of substitution, absence of complementarity, etc.). However, the 
estimated indirect utility functions cannot always be easily transformed into 
the corresponding direct ones. We do not know the direct utility functions for 
such widely cited indirect utility functions as Houthaldcer's indirect addilog, 
Diewert's generalized Leontief cost funciions. or various translog forms (includ- 
ing the AXDS of Deaton and Muellbauer). 
But our inability to  state the direct utility function for (11) in an explicit 
form does not remove the possibility of solving (11) whenever the indirect util- 
ity function corresponding to  u ( z , y )  is known. First, let  us introduce some 
notation. Let u ( z  ) = u (Z .y) be the (not explicitly known) direct utility func- 
tion and g (v )  its indirect form. Under familiar conditions relating to quasicon- 
cavity and monotonicity of u ( z ) ,  we know that  g (v)  satisfying 
g (v) = max t v ( z )  : vz s 11 
z 
is quasiconvex and nonincreasing. Conversely (see Diewert 1974. p. 124). under 
quasiconvexity and nonincreasing monotonicity of g (v )  , it is clear tha t  u ( z )  
satisfies 
u ( z )  = min Ig(v)  : vz < l j  
V 
(12) 
The ability to  compute the value of the direct utility function for any z = (z ,y) ,  
even when only the indirect utility function is known (12), suffices for the 
efficient computation of the  optimum solution to (11). This is because modern 
gradient methods of mathematical (concave) programming theory require just 
that and no more. The quasigradient methods do without exact derivatives of 
the maximand. Instead, they run on approximations given - in our context - 
by b i t e  differences h"[u(z + hei) - u(z)],  where ei is the i t h  unit vector and 
h is a positive scalar (see Brauninger 1981). 
Also, i t  may be worth noting that  the exact gradient of the totally uncon- 
strained (even by the budget inequality) ordinary utility function may be rela- 
tively easily computed for any commodity bundle when only the indirect utility 
function is known. The following "dual" to the classical Roy's Identity holds: 
where & is the solution to the optimization problem: 
min fg(v)  : uz I l j  
v 
and is the corresponding optimal Lagrange multiplier for t he  constraint 
uz I: 1. Expression (13) can be immediately demonstrated Roy's ldentity 
states that 
where z* is the solution to the optimization problem: 
max I u ( z )  : zv < 1j 
z 
and A* is the corresponding optimal Lagrange multiplier for the constraint 
vz s 1. Noting that  Roy's ldentity also applies to (12), we arrive at (13). I t  is 
also worth noticing tha t  the first-order conditions applicable to  (13) are 
n 
Together with (13), these imply that A* = -A. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
While the theory proposed by Neary and Roberts appears to be incorrect, 
there is still the possibility of a computational determination of effective 
demand under rationing, irrespective of whether direct or indirect utility func- 
tions (or expenditure functions) for households (firms) are  known. The method 
suggested here works quite well, even under rationing regimes not often visual- 
ized in contemporary economic theory but very familiar from economic prac- 
tice ("softening" devices for quantity constraints through variable pricing and 
partial substitutability of rations). The price paid for this approach is the need 
to rely on computational iterative rather than analytical methods. Compara- 
tive statics exercises, which are the gist of much abstract economic work, can 
still be easily performed with respect to the solutions arrived at,  though they 
would more accurately be termed "sensitivity analyses." It appears, however, 
that  the indeterminate conclusions as to the impacts of infinitesimal variations 
in the parameters on the endogenous economic variables must be expected 
with much greater frequency than one might normally be used to. This, how- 
ever, may just be part of a lesson of broader significance concerning the  status 
of economic theories. 
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